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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an equitable action by plaintiff-appellant,
Granite School District, a political subdivision of the
State of Utah (herein referred to as Granite), against
defendants/respondents/cross-appellants, Salt Lake County,
also a political subdivision of the State of Utah (herein
referred to as County), and Arthur L. Monson, who has held
the statutory office of Salt Lake County Treasurer since
January, 1975 (herein referred to as Treasurer).

Granite

asserts that the Treasurer did not turn over Granite's
share of real property tax monies collected for the years
1973-1974 (First Cause of Action), 1974-1975

(Second Cause

of Action), 1975-1976 (Third Cause of Action) and 1976-1977
(Fourth Cause of Action) in a timely manner as the Statutes
require.
The action also involves a Counterclaim filed by
County to recover against Granite those monies actually
expended by County in behalf of Granite to assess, collect,
apportion and distribute tax monies to Granite in excess of
the amount actually paid by Granite for such services during
the same period of time.

Said Counterclaim also sought

recovery of the amount of unjust enrichment realized by
Granite at the expense of the other taxing districts because

-1-
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of early turn-over of funds to Granite.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Granite filed an Alias Second Amended Complaint
against county and Treasurer seeking judgment on each cause
of action for that income earned or which should have been
earned by County and Treasurer from the Treasurer's
investing of tax monies collected by his office.

Granite

also sought an injunction to compel the Treasurer to pay
over all monies due within the time required by State law.
County and Treasurer filed a Counterclaim seeking
to recover those funds expended by County in excess of the
sums paid by Granite to collect, apportion and distribute
tax monies to Granite.

Treasurer also asserted in said

Counterclaim that because of early turn over of tax monies
to Granite by Treasurer, that Granite became unjustly
enriched at the expense of certain other taxing districts
located within Salt Lake County to the extent Granite
realized investment income on said funds.
The Trial Court ruled that Salt Lake County was not
unjustly enriched by the actions of the Treasurer at the
expense of Granite School District.

It further ruled that

Granite was not unjustly enriched at the expense of Salt
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Lake County even though the cost of collecting, apportioning
and distributing tax monies to Granite exceeded the amount
paid for said services by Granite.

The Court also deter-

mined that the Treasurer, Monson, had performed his duties
in accordance with the Statutes governing his office and in
the manner set forth by the State Tax Commission of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake County Treasurer
seek affirmance of the decision of the Trial Court insofar
as it determined that the County had not been unjustly
enriched through the actions of the Treasurer at the expense
of Granite and that the Treasurer has performed his duties
in accordance with the Statutes governing his office and as
set forth by the State Tax Commission of Utah.
The County seeks reversal of that portion of the
Trial Court's decision which denies recovery to the County
even though the cost of collecting, apportioning, and
distributing tax monies to Granite School District exceeds
the amount paid for such services by Granite.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
County and Treasurer object to the purported
Statement of Facts as set forth in Granite's Brief.

The

-3-
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purported "Summary of Facts" is nothing more than a statement of Granite's misconceived perception of the case, its
position and the relief Granite seeks.

It is not a state-

ment of the actual facts, summary or otherwise.

The

"Statement of Facts in Detail" submitted by Granite
contains, for the most part, conclusions, argument, theory,
suppositions, assumptions, and proposed solutions, but very
few facts.
Granite and County are 2 of 48 public taxing entities located within Salt Lake County for which the Treasurer
collects and distributes funds (T-429).

The 48 separate

taxing entities contain 130 separate taxing districts each
of which has its own separate mill levy.

Within these

districts and entities are over 200,000 separate assessable
properties upon which a tax must be levied, collected and
distributed (T-430).
During the year the Treasurer receives checks and
monies from many sources, including monies from Salt Lake
County taxpayers within the taxing jurisdiction of each of
the 48 entities and 130 districts.

During the latter part

of November of each year, up to and including the 30th day
of November, said Treasurer receives checks and monies for

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

real property taxes which are deposited by him (T-430).
Because of the large number of taxpayers, entities
and districts involved, the funds were first deposited for
collection and then separated at a later time when proper
identification of funds could be made.

There was no capabi-

lity during the years in question to separate, segregate and
separately identify funds received when and as paid (T-430).
The Treasurer receives monies from several sources including
sales taxes, personal property taxes, real property taxes,
licenses, revenue sharing and bail forfeitures.
he receives the money, he deposits it.

As soon as

He does not identify

it as property tax money or sales tax money or any kind of
money at the time of the deposit (T-56).

Until he is

charged through final settlement by the Salt Lake County
Auditor, he is unable to ascertain with certainty the exact
amount of funds collected for each entity or district (T-67).
He does not know, at the time of collection, how much money
is due and owing to each entity or district.

To the best of

his ability he estimates in order to advance monies to the
districts, but he does not know, and will not know until
charged, how much he collected for each district (T-66).

He

instructs his employees " ••• to compute to the extent they
can the amount that the district has coming ••• " (T-66).

The
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Treasurer's employees improve on the estimation each year.
"The challenge is to come as close as they can to meet final
settlement.

We compute and meet final settlement on March

31st without being charged, and when we are finally charged,
to see how close we come.
refined every year."

And so, the formula is being

(T-67-68).

No evidence was presented

at trial to establish that the Treasurer, at the time of
collection, was capable of separate segregation or identification of the monies to specific taxing entities as the
same were received (T-431).
The evidence is further uncontroverted that
numerous large institutional taxpayers draw tax payment
checks on out of State banks, thereby extending the time
within which said funds are finally cleared and in the hands
of the Salt Lake County Treasurer.

Even though checks have

been received or postmarked as of the 30th of November of
each year, said checks may not have cleared the bank and
become good funds in the hands of the Treasurer until sometime after said checks were deposited by the Treasurer
(T-431).

Even though such funds are deposited illllnediately,

segregation and identification of payment to property and
therefore district, takes place at a later date (T-66).
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In

that regard, the Treasurer acts as a fiduciary for all of
the public entities located within Salt Lake County,
including Granite School District and Salt Lake County
(T-432).

Prior to the date of final settlement, there are
numerous activities that take place with regard to the
assessment roll and the tax collection process that affect
the amount of taxes collected and, therefore, renders it
impractical for the Treasurer to know on any given date,
exactly how much money he has on hand for each of the public
taxing entities.

These activities occur in each of the 48

separate taxing entities in Salt Lake County.

Included in

such activities that affect the amount ultimately collected
are actions by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in
raising and lowering assessments; the collection process
related to attached and unattached personal property;
actions of the State Tax Commission of Utah acting on
appeals; indigent abatements, veterans abatements, and blind
abatements; refund actions for taxes illegally or erroneously paid or collected and Treasurer's relief, unpaid
taxes and tax sales are all activities that affect the
assessment roll, the collection process and the amounts
collected, which render it impractical for the Treasurer, on

-7-
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any given date prior to final settlement, to ascertain
exactly how much money he should have on hand and how much
of said money belongs to each of the various 48 public

taxing entities located within Salt Lake County (T-432-433),

Plaintiff's original Complaint contained two causes
of action.

The First Cause of Action sought damages by way

of recovery of monies Granite would have earned had it
received earlier turn over of funds and also sought compensation for the cost of tax anticipation borrowing for the
year 1973-1974.

The Second Cause of Action was identical,

except it involved the years 1974-1975 (T-2-6).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed May 11, 1976,
was substantially the same as the original Complaint, but
included the tax year 1975-1976 and an additional damage
claim for 1975 (T-14-19).
On February 3, 1977, Granite filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The Court granted Granite's Motion for

Summary Judgment on the liability issue, but reserved the
issue of damages (T-124-125).
After several hearings before the Court, Granite
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended complaint.
The reason stated for the Motion was to include tax collec-
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tions for the 1976 tax year (T-334).

In a hearing before

the Trial Court on September 19, 1978, it was agreed by the
parties that the action was an action in equity rather than
in law.

Plaintiff, Granite, was granted leave to amend its

Complaint to plead its case in equity (T-455-462).
On the 16th day of October, 1978, another hearing
was held before the Trial Judge for purposes of stipulating
to the issues to be tried.

The Second Amended Complaint was

withdrawn and plaintiff was granted leave to file a new
Second Amended Complaint and defendant was granted ten days
to respond with the plaintiff filing a reply ten days after
the defendants' Answer and Counterclaim (T-336).
Granite's Alias Second Amended Complaint was filed
on the 27th day of November, 1978.
of itself.

That Complaint was an entirely new lawsuit from

the ones previously filed.
(T-237-243).

It was complete in and

It was an action in equity

Plaintiffs had never filed a Notice of Claim

with Salt Lake County on any of the years in question
(T-297-299), therefore, they had to change the entire theory
of their case in order to try to avoid the legal affect of
the failure to file such a claim.

Defendants filed an

Answer and Counterclaim to Granite's Alias Second Amended
Complaint.

County's Counterclaim also proceeded on an

-9-
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equitable theory.

The Treasurer, in his efforts to accomo-

date Granite during the years in question, had made advancements of tax monies in excess of the amounts that were
actually collected for Granite at that point in time.
The Trial Court determined that there was no evidence presented by Granite at Trial to show the exact dollar
amount on deposit for Granite School Distrct on any given
day during the period of time covered in Granite's Alias
Second Amended Complaint.

The Trial Court also found the

evidence to be uncontroverted that Salt Lake County, during
the years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, expended
$1,133,415.00 more to collect, apportion and distribute tax
monies to Granite than was paid for by

Granite (T-434).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
GRANITE'S ALIAS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
RENDERED ALL PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS,
INCLUDING THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
NULL AND VOID.
Judge Winder, pursuant to Motion and argument,
granted Granite a Partial Summary Judgment on its Amended
Complaint.

Nearly sixteen months later, after several Court

hearings, Granite, after receiving leave of Court, filed an

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Alias Second Amended Complaint.

The Alias Second Amended

Complaint was directed towards shifting the theory of
plaintiff's case from one at law to one in equity.

The

theory of the case under Judge Winder was in the nature of
damages allegedly suffered by Granite because of claimed
late turn-over of funds.

The theory of the Alias Second

Amended Complaint filed before Judge Banks was in equity
seeking recovery of any benefit realized by Salt Lake
County.

The later amendment was complete in and of itself.
In Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and

Helpers, Local Union 222 v. Motor Cargo, 530 P2d 807 (Utah
1974), this Court stated:
"The law is overwhelming to the effect that when an
amended complaint, complete in and of itself, is
filed, the former complaint is functus officio and
cannot be used for any purpose." (Emphasis supplied)
In Sheay v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 122
P2d 60 (1942), the plaintiff had obtained a judgment by
default.

Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint.

The

Court, in allowing the amendment referred to the general
rule that when a complaint is amended in substance, it
operates to open a default.

Not only did the filing of the

Amended Complaint vacate the default, it superceded the original Complaint, which dropped out of the case and ceased
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to' have any affect as a pleading or as a basis for a
judgment.

In Captain v. Los Angeles Wrecking Co., 215 P2d

532 (1950), the Court concluded:
"Furthermore, the Court was without power to permit
the filing of a second amended complaint without
first vacating the judgment which had been entered
on June 29th."
In the instant case, Granite filed two Amended
Complaints after they had been granted Partial Summary
Judgment.

The previously granted Partial Summary Judgment

became a nullity and was of no force or effect.

Granite was

required to prove its entire case on its "Alias Second
Amended Complaint" and could not, therefore, rely upon the
prior Partial Summary Judgment for any purpose.
However, even if the prior Partial Summary Judgment
were valid and enforceable, Granite failed to prove any
unjust enrichment of County at its expense.

With respect to

Granite's First Cause of Action, there was no evidence in
the record to show that the then Treasurer, who was not a
party to the action, invested any collected funds at
interest.

Treasurer Monson did not take office until 1975,

and since there was no evidence that any party other than
the Treasurer was an active party, County could hardly be
held responsible for any act committed by someone not be~ore
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the Court, and, likewise, Treasurer Monson could not be held
responsible for matters taking place prior to the time he
assumed office.
Granite's own Exhibits P-2, P-3, and P-4, further
supported the Trial Court's finding that there was no unjust
enrichment of the County.

Exhibits P-2 and P-3 show the

actual collection times for the years in question.

They

further showed that even though collections may have been
credited on the 29th or 30th of November, the funds were in
fact collected much later--in December.

A comparison of

those Exhibits to P-4, also introduced by Granite,
established that monies were being turned over to Granite as
they were being collected.

Plaintiff, Granite's own

Exhibits, clearly showed that the Treasurer had in fact performed better than his predecessor in office.

Exhibit P-10,

introduced by Granite, further established that final
settlement for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977, was made by
the Statutory deadline of March 31st.
Granite's own witness, William Sampson, testified
that he could not say how much of Granite's money, if any,
was on deposit on any given date.

His approach was to take

the total received at the end of the year or by settlement
date, and then deduce backwards.

This approach was purely
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hypothetical and was not supported by any facts except for
the year end total.

He did not know whether the money on

deposit belonged to Granite or the other 49 taxing entities.
He did not know when the monies were, in fact, received.
The evidence further indicated that there were
times when Granite, through the Treasurer's policy of
advancing funds, received as much as 92% of the total monies
collected for all taxing districts, even though Granite's
share was less than 20% of the total (T-152-168).

For these

reasons, the Trial Court correctly concluded that Salt Lake
County had not been enriched at the expense of Granite
School District.

Therefore, even if the Partial Summary

Judgment were enforceable, Granite failed to prove that it
was injured by the Treasurer's actions or that the County
received a benefit at the expense of Granite.
POINT II
GRANITE'S CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY
AND THE COUNTY TREASURER WERE BARRED BY
THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
Immunity on an action for damages arising out of
governmental activities is absolute unless waived by
Statute1 likewise, strict procedural compliance with presentation of claim Statutes is prerequisite of bringing
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suit and, finally, a suit must be brought within the time
prescribed by Statutes of Limitation.

Judicial interpreta-

tion concerning each of these requirements is replete in
Utah law with the exception of a direct holding as to
whether immunity itself is waived as between political
subdivisions.
As to procedural matters, including presentation of
claims, the Statutes of Limitation, Statutory law binds
public as well as private parties.

The evidence is

uncontroverted that Granite did not file a Notice of Claim
with Salt Lake County for any of the years in question.
As to legal status of immunity itself, one could
take the obvious approach by stating that immunity as between political subdivisions is not waived because there is
no Utah Statute providing such a waiver.
comport with the universal rule.

Indeed, this would

Perhaps the reason for a

dearth of direct authority on the matter is that it has been
thought settled.

However, California has held that all

Statutes concerning immunity, presentation of claims and
limitations on actions are applicable as between political
subdivisions, and Respondents submit this is a reasonable
interpretation.

Any other interpretation creates great dif-
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ficulty in delineating when Statutes of Limitations begin to
run.

State Health Department v. Imperial County, 153 P2d

957 (Cal. App. 1944); Veteran's Welfare Board v. City of
Oakland, 169 P2d 1000, 1007 (Cal. App. 1946).
In the Trial Court, the County has extensively
argued that Granite has no remedy against it for injuries
that may have occurred pursuant to the County's governmental
taxing activities or pursuant to discretionary acts of the
County Treasurer.

However, if for purposes of argument, one

assumes immunity under the Statute has been waived, then
Granite is nevertheless barred because it did not file a
Notice of Claim.

See Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P2d

646 (Utah 1976) and extensive citations therein.

Section

63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953, state unequivocally:
"A claim against a political subdivision shall be
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed
within ninety days after the cause of action
arises • • • " (emphasis added)
In Varoz v. Sevey, 29 U.2d 158, 506 P2d 435 (Utah
1973), in upholding the dismissal of a wrongful death action
by a minor when the notice of claim was filed after ninety

days had elapsed, the Court said:
"From the language of the Statute it is quite clear
that the Legislature intended to make the filing of
a timely notice of claim prerequisite to maintaining an action."
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In Roosendall Construction & Mining Corporation v.
Holman, 28 U.2d 396 (1972), the Court, in construing the
filing of a claim requirement as it relates to the State and
affirming dismissal for failure to file, stated:
"As to the plaintiff's claim for damages it must
proceed, if at all, pursuant to the provisions of
Title 63, Chapter 30, u.c.A., 1953, known as the
Governmental Immunity Act. A prerequisite in
pursuing a claim against the State or its officers
is compliance with • • • (filing of claim within one
year) • • • It appears the plaintiff's complaint is
fatally defective in that it does not allege
~
compliance with that section." (emphasis added)
Even assuming plaintiff's complaint would be considered notice of claim, for which there is no authority,
the suit is barred because it was not initiated within
.ninety days after the cause of action (arose) ••

n

Granite commenced its action on November 25, 1975,
which was at least six months after its Second Cause of
Action arose and at least eighteen months after its First
Cause of Action arose.

Had Granite first filed a claim at

the time it commenced this suit, it would have been barred
by not filing a timely claim.

How then can Granite maintain

a suit when it cannot meet the requirements for even filing
a claim, a prerequisite to suit?
Furthermore, allowing suit without first requiring
the filing of a claim has the effect of permitting a plain-
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tiff to extend the Statute of Limitations.

The limitation

period on actions brought under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act is at best one year and three months.

Section

63-30-15, u.c.A., 1953, reads:
"If a claim is denied, a claimant may institute an
action in the district court against the governmental entity in those circumstances where immunity
from suit has been waived as in this Act provided.
Said action must be commenced within one year after
denial or the denial period as specified herein."
In Utah, the State and its political subdivisions
are subject to Statutes of Limitations.

See Section

78-12-33, U.C.A., 1953, and annotations thereunder.
Sequentially then, under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, three conditions must be met if plaintiff is
to have a remedy: (1)

the cause of action must be a

Statutory exception to immunity; (2) a timely notice must
be filed; and (3) suit must be brought within the time
prescribed.

Granite's suit failed to meet any of the afore-

said conditions.
POINT III
GRANITE HAS NO REMEDY AGAINST SALT LAKE
COUNTY EVEN IF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT IS NOT APPLICABLE.
Common law sovereign immunity bars recovery against
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-Salt Lake County on cause of action for damages arising out
of governmental activity.

Johnson v. Salt Lake county

cottonwood Sanitary District, 20 U.2d 389, 438 P2d 706
(1968).

Granite has not contested that tax matters are

governmental.

However, assuming common law immunity is

waived, a plaintiff must nevertheless file a claim before
filing suit.

State v. Dixon, 22 u.2d 58, 448 P2d 716

(1968); Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P2d 476 (Utah 1975).

In

Edwards, the Court stated:
0

No notice of claim was filed by plaintiff with
the County. The plaintiff filed her complaint on
June 7, 1973, and a summons was served on September
6, 1973. The first notification of plaintiff's
claim came when these proceedings were initiated.
The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to file a
notice of a claim as provided for in Section
63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953, which states that a claim
against a political subdivision shall be forever
barred unless notice thereof is filed within 90
days after the cause of action arises. The fact
that employees of the county knew of plaintiff's
injuries at the time they occurred does not
dispense with the necessity of filing a timely
claim.
(Varoz v. Sevey, 29 U.2d 158, 506 P2d 435)
The plaintiff's claim would also be barred by the
provisions of Section 17-15-10, u.c.A., 1953.
The filing of a complaint with the clerk of
the district court, even though done one day before
the year had elapsed would not comply with the requirements of filing a claim as required by Section
17-15-10, u.c.A., 1953 • • • "
Section 17-15-10, u.c.A., 1953, reads:
"The board of county commissioners shall not
hear or consider any claim of any person against
-19-
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the county, nor shall the board credit or allow any
claim or bill against the county, unless the same
is itemized, giving names, dates and particular
service renderd, or until it has been passed upon
by the county auditor. If the claim is for service
of process, it shall state the cha7acter of process
served, upon whom, the number of miles traveled; if
for materials furnished, to whom, by whom ordered,
quantity and price agreed upon. Every claim
against the county must be presented to the counti
auditor within a year after the last item of the
account or claim accrued. In all cases claims
shall be duly substantiated as to their correctness
and as to the fact that they are justly due. If
the board shall refuse to hear or consider a claim
because it is not properly made out, it shall cause
notice of the fact to be given to the claimant or
to his agent, • • • " (emphasis added)
Upon receiving the claim, the County Auditor has
certain Statutory duties to perform.

Section 17-19-1 reads:

•All persons holding claims against a county
must present the same to the county auditor, and he
shall investigate and examine into all such claims,
and report the same, together with his findings, to
the board of county commissioners at the next
regular session after such investigation shall
have been completed, with his approval or
disapproval, endorsed thereon; and he shall keep,
in a book kept for that purpose, a complete record
of all such claims and of his action thereon and
the reasons for the same, and the action of the
board thereon. All bills, claims, accounts or
charges for materials of any kind or nature that
may be purchased by or on behalf of the county by
any of the county officers or contracted for by the
board of county commissioners shall be
investigated, examined and inspected by the county
a~ditor, and he shall endorse his approval or
disapproval thereon before any warrant for the
payment of the same can be drawn."
Finally, it is the duty of the County Attorney to
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• .oppose all claims and accounts against the county when
he deems then unjust or illegal."

Section 17-18-2, u.c.A.,

1953.
With respect to such claims applicable Statute of
Limitations, similar to that governing the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act apply to suits brought against the County.
Section 78-12-30, U.C.A., 1953, reads:
"Actions on claims against a county, city, or
incorporated town, which have been rejected by the
board of county commissioners, city commissioners,
city council or board of trustees, as the case may
be, must be commenced within one year after the
first rejection thereof by such board of county or
city commissioners, city council or board of
trustees."
County and Treasurer urge upon this Court that
Granite's remedy against it must fail for want of waiver of
sovereign immunity, failure to file a timely claim and by
reason of the Statute of Limitations.
Allowing the suit to proceed without the prerequisite review and determination by County officials
constitutes a judicial intrusion into government.

The

jurisdiction of the Court in the instant matter attaches
only after the County has acted or failed to act on a claim
properly filed.

The Trial Court, by entertaining this suit,

prematurely precluded the County's elected officers from
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exercising duties accorded them by law.
POINT IV
THE STATUTORY
u.c.A. (1953)
ARE DIRECTORY
THE TREASURER

DUTIES OF SECTION 53-7-10,
AND 59-10-66, u.c.A. (1953),
AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE BY
IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE.

In Point II of its Brief, Granite argues for strict
compliance with the Statutory deadlines involved in this
case and then attempts to distinguish four earlier Utah
cases dealing with the subject.

However, Granite completely

ignores this Court's more recent case of Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P2d 705 (Utah 1978), which
held similar Statutory deadlines to be directory rather than
mandatory and therefore, substantial compliance to be
sufficient.

The guidelines set down by this Court in

Kennecott are equally applicable to the instant case.

"The

most fundamental one is that the Court should give effect to
the intention of the Legislature."

In the instant case, the

legislative intent was to set the time frame within which
to collect, turn over, and finally account for property tax
revenues.

That intent has not been frustrated by the

Treasurer's actions herein.

In fact, the Trial Court speci-

fically concluded that he had performed his duties in accordance with the Statutes governing his office (T-435).
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There

is no indication in the Statutes governing the Treasurer's
office that would indicate that the Legislature intended
that an untimely performance on the part of the Treasurer
would render his actions illegal.

There is no indication

that the Legislature intended that the County become liable
for an untimely performance by the Treasurer, if, in fact,
his performance was untimely.

It is respectfully submitted

that under the facts of this case and this Court's ruling in
Kennecott, supra the Treasurer has fully complied with his
Statutory duties and there is therefore no basis upon which
to assert liability to Granite.
POINT V
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES AND THE UTAH MONEY
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1974 DENY GRANITE A
REMEDY AGAINST THE COUNTY TREASURER FOR
DAMAGES AND LIMIT GRANITE'S REMEDY TO A
FORFEITURE OF THE TREASURER'S SALARY.
In applying common law principles of immunity from
liability, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Anderson v.
Granite School District, 17 U.2d 405, 413 P2d 597 (1966) at
599:

"In common with other public officers, they
(defendant school board members) have authority to
do whatever is reasonably necessary in carrying out
duties imposed upon them. It would be impractical
and unfair to require them to act at their own
risk. This would not only be disruptive of the
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proper functioning of public institutions, but
undoubtedly would dissuade competent and responsible
persons from accepting.the re~po~sibilities of
public office. Accordingly, it is the settled
policy of the law that when a public official acts
in good faith, believing what he does to be within
the scope of his authority and in line with his
duty, he is not liable for damages even if he makes
a mistake in the exercise of his judgment."
Immunity from liability for a mistake in judgment
n

.extends to errors in the determination of both of law,

and of fact."

Logan City v. Allen, 44 P2d 1085, 1087 (Utah

1935).
In Board of Education of Nebo School District v.
Jeppson, 74

u.

576, 280 P. 1065 (1929) the School Board sued

the County Treasurer and his surety for a decrease in its
tax monies occasioned by an irregular or void abatement.
denying liability, the Court said at 74

u.

In

587, 588:

"• •• there are instances in which a public officer
who in good faith and in a perplexing situation,
makes an erroneous decision as to his duty and acts
thereon and thereby violates the law will not be
held liable • • • Such a case is Jefferson County v.
Ross, 196 Ky. 366, 244 s.w. 793. In this case
Ross, a tax collector, in good faith, and in a
perplexing situation as to the rule of law
governing the matter, paid over to the State auditor certain taxes which should have been paid over
to the school board. It was held that the tax
collector was not liable to the school board for
diverting the funds • • • •
Granite contends that judgment and discretion are
not required in disbursing tax monies even though at least
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three different Statutes and the State Tax Manual are
contradictory:

Section 53-7-10, U.C.A., 1953, provides

turn-over of funds " • • • within thirty days after it is
collected,"; Section 59-10-66, U.C.A., 1953, provides
• • • • on the first day of each month, all monies in his
hands collected," and Section 51-4-2, U.C.A., 1953, provides
• • • • on or before the tenth day of each month • • • funds
received or collected • • • within the month last past," and
the Tax Manual states: "• •• January 1 and monthly
thereafter."
Respondents urge that in choosing the Statute or
Rule to follow, the Treasurere necessarily selects among
alternatives.

Whenever alternatives are present, judgment

and discretion are operative, notwithstanding Granite's
assertions to the contrary.
In addition, whether or not the County Treasurer
invests funds, including tax monies, is entirely
discretionary, Section 51-7-11, u.c.A., 1953, as are the
types of investments he makes so long as they are within
Statutory guidelines.

Sections 51-7-11 and 51-7-17, u.c.A.,

1953.
Also, because there is no Statute on the subject,
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Respondents contend that the Treasurer, confronted with the
inability or impracticability of apportioning interest on
tax monies among the 40 taxing districts, was acting both
with discretion and in good faith when said interest was
transferred to the County's general fund.
The Utah Money Management Act of 1974, 51-7-1, et
seq., u.c.A., 1953, further limits the liability of the
County Treasurer in two ways.

First, he and his bondsman

are released from liability for any loss of public funds
occasioned by investments made in conformity with the Act,
unless the loss is the result of malfeasance.
51-7-15, U.C.A., 1953.

Section

Consequently, any interest "lost" by

Granite is governed by this provision and Granite did not
allege or prove malfeasance.
The second limitation is brought about by the 1974
amendment to Section 51-4-2, u.c.A., 1953.
The penalty imposed by Statute on a County
Treasurer for failure to settle or make payments to the
State is three months forfeiture of salary.

59-10-69,

U.C.A., 1953:
"Every county treasurer who neglects or refuses to
make payment as herein required shall forfeit three
months salary • • • " (emphasis added)
The "as herein required" references Section 51-4-2,
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u.c.A., 1953, which was amended by Utah State Money
Management Act of 1974.

Prior to the Act, Section 51-4-2

only applied to monies the County Treasurer was required to
pay the State.

The amendment expanded the requirement to

payments made by the County Treasurer to all political
subdivisions.
Respondents therefore submit that it was the intention of the Utah State Legislature to provide all political
subdivision with the same recourse as the State--a forefeiture of salary for the failure of the County Treasurer to
remit tax payments in a timely manner.
POINT VI
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT A TRUSTEE OF
PLAINTIFF'S TAX MONIES, NOR IS THE COUNTY
TREASURER THE AGENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IN
THE COLLECTION OF SAID FUNDS, NOR IS SALT
LAKE COUNTY LIABLE FOR OFFICIAL ACTS OF
THE COUNTY TREASURER IN DISBURSING THOSE
FUNDS.
Granite consistently muddles the role of Salt Lake
County, acting through its Board of Commissioners and the
role of the County Treasurer with respect to tax matters.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supporting the Partial summary Judgment now relied upon by
Granite in its appeal, do not even mention the defendant
Salt Lake County.

Likewise, all of the Statutes quoted by
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Granite in its attempt to demonstrate liability refer solely
to the duties imposed on County Treasurers by the State
Legislature.

Unfortunately, both factually and legally,

Granite persists in concluding that Salt Lake County has
breached a duty to Granite although said County had nothing
to do with the matters complained of by Granite.
Both Statutes cited by Granite concerning the disbursements of school district tax money, Section 53-7-10 and
Section 59-10-66, U.C.A., 1953, relate to the Treasurer's
duty to collect and disburse tax money.

The Board of

Commissioners' Statutory role is only to establish the tax
levy.

Furthermore, the Board of Commissioners does not

supervise the activities of a Treasurer in performing his
official tax duties.

Section 11, Artice XIII, of the

Constitution of Utah, grants that prerogative to the Utah
State Tax Commission:
"The State Tax Commission shall administer andsupervise the tax laws of the State."
Pursuant to the aforesaid Constitutional mandate, the Utah
State Legislature has delegated the following powers and
duties to the Tax Commission.

Section 59-5-46, U.C.A.,

1953:
"(3)

To prescribe such rules and regulations as
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it may deem necessary, not in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of the State, to govern
county boards and officers in the performance of
any duty in connection with assessment, equalization and collection of general taxes."
"(9) To have and exercise general supervision
over the administration of the tax laws of the
State, over assessors and over county boards in the
performance of their duties as county boards of
equalization and over other county officers in the
performance of their duties in connection with
assessment of property and collection of taxes, to
the end that all assessments of property be made
just and equal, at true value, and that the tax
burden may be distributed without favor or
discrimination."
"{11) To confer with, advise and direct county
treasurers and assessors in matters relating to the
assessment and equalization of property for taxation and the collection of taxes, and to provide
for an hold annually at such time and place as may
be convenient to district or State convention of
county assessors to consider and discuss matters
relative to taxation, uniformity of valuation, and
changes in the law relative to taxation, and
methods of assessment. Every county assessor
called to attend such district or state convention
shall attend at the time and place designated by
the tax commission. The traveling expense of each
county assessor called to attend such convention
shall be a charge against the county and paid in
the same manner as other claims against the
county."
"{12) To confer with, advise and direct other
county officers charged by law with duties relating
to the assessment and equalization of property for
taxation and the collection of taxes, and to provide for and hold at such times and places as may
be deemed necessary district or state conventions
of such officers for the consideration and
discussion of matters relative to taxation, uniformity of valuation, and changes in the laws relative
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"Suppose any one of the school district officers
should embezzle funds or destroy or appropriate to
his own use any other property of the corporation,
could the county, or the county commissioners in
its name and behalf, institute and maintain an
action to recover the same? We think no one will
seriously so contend. A conclusive answer to such
an action is that the county has nothing to do with
either the funds or officers of the school corporation or has nothing to do with either the funds
or officers of the school corporation or has any in
interest in their funds.
For convenience the county treasurer is charged
with the duty of collecting all moneys derived from
tax action in his county, including school taxes.
After collecting them, he must account for them.
The Legislature could have required him to account
to the officers of the high school district, or to
the state superintendent of schools, or to the
county commissioners and to the state
superintendent, as was done • • • In our judgment,
when the county treasurer has paid the money to
the school district treasurers, as required by the
statute, he has discharged the full duty imposed
upon him by law respecting school funds."
With respect to trust law, and cases construing the
same, the Treasurer may indeed be a trustee of plaintiff's
tax monies to the same extent as he may be a trustee with
respect to 40 other taxing districts, including Salt Lake
County.

However, Salt Lake County is not the trustee, and

if any breach of trust occurred, the breach was committed by
the Treasurer, not the County.

Further, the governing body

of the County, its Board of Commissioners, was never
informed by Granite that the Treasurer was not performing as
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required by law.

At most, Salt Lake County or its general

fund is the unwitting recipient of interest alleged to have
been earned by the Treasurer on Granite's tax money and,
even as to such money, Granite admits " • • • because of the
county's (sic) investment policies and the commingling of
funds belonging to various governmental units, the actual
interest earned is uncertain." (T-199)

Further, as set

forth in Point I of this Brief, Granite failed to introduce
any evidence that would show that any interest was earned on
funds belonging to Granite.
Furthermore, the Board of Commissioners not only
has no duty to invest money, whether its own or Granite's,
it has no right to invest funds.
Treasurer.

That right lies with the

State Money Management Act of 1974, Section

51-7-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953.

Even so, the Treasurer's

right to invest is just that--a

right~

law to invest public money.

he is not required by

Section 51-7-17, U.C.A., 1953.

Granite's assertion to the contrary is without foundation.
Granite's consistent references to laws concerning private
fiduciaries are irrelevant.

The duties of both the Board of

Commissioners and the Treasurer are determined by Statute.
With respect to its complaints pertaining to the
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Treasurer on tax matters, Granite perhaps would be better
advised to charge the State of Utah with a breach of duty
rather than Salt Lake County, since the State Tax Commission
has specific Statutory supervision over the Treasurer in tax
matters, as noted earlier, and Section 7, Article X, of the
Utah Constitution reads:
•All public School Funds shall be guaranteed by the
State against loss or diversion."
Granite's references to Pomona City School District
v. Payne, 50 P2d 822 (Cal. App. 1955) and other California

cases as supportive of its trust and interest theories have
little relevancy.

Under the California Depository Act, the

school district was required to keep its funds on deposit in
the County Treasury and by law the County Treasurer was
required by Act to pay interest on those funds.
Similarly, the case of State of Missouri ex rel.
Fort Zumwalt v. Dickleslen, 576 So2d 532 (Mo. 1979) is not
applicable to the instant case because Missouri, like
California, had a specific Statute that dealt with the subject of interest on school district funds.
Statutory requirement.
District, 593 S.W.2d
distinguishable.

Utah has no such

Mears v. Little Rock School
42 (Ark. 1980), is also

In that case, Pulaski County Quorum Court
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passed an ordinance that had the effect of allowing the
county to use all tax monies to earn interest.

The Supreme

court determined such an Ordinance to be illegal.

In the

instant case, there is no evidence to show that the County
or the Treasurer deliberately held onto tax funds to
generate interest.

The evidence is that he used his best

efforts to ascertain whose money it probably was and then
made advancements.

The Court in Mears further determined

that the Ordinance was contrary to a specific provision of
the Arkansas Constitution.

No such challenge exists in the

case at bar.
In the instant case, Granite was never able to show
how much, if any, of its monies were on deposit at any given
time.

The money was coming in from all taxing districts,

advances were being made based upon previous years'
performance.

Finally, in Mears, the Court relied on a spe-

cific act by the Arkansas Legislature which specifically
prohibited the County from passing:
"(c) Any legislative act that applied to or affect
the public school system except that a County
government may impose an assessment where
established by the General Assembly, reasonably
related to the cost of any service or specific
benefit provided by County government •• •"
593

s.w.

2d 42 at page 44.

No such provision or prohibition
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has been asserted in the instant case.

It is therefore sub-

mitted that the cases cited by Granite are not controlling
in the instant action.
Finally, even assuming the County Treasurer is
liable to Granite for failure to perform his duties as
required by law, Granite has no remedy against Salt Lake
county.

It is, and has been the law in Utah since

Statehood, that the sole remedy for the deliction of a
public official in performing duties imposed upon him by
Statute is to proceed against said official and his surety.
Section 52-1-7, u.c.A., 1953, reads:
"The official bond of a public official shall be
deemed a security to the state, county, city, town,
school district or other municipal or public
corporation, as the case may be, and also to all
persons severally, for official delinquencies
against which it is intended to provide."
Section 52-1-8, U.C.A., 1953, states:
"When a public officer by official misconduct or
neglect of duty shall forfeit his bond or render
his sureties liable thereon, any person injured by
such misconduct or neglect, or who by law is
entitled to the benefit of the security, may maintain an action thereon in his own name against the
officer and his sureties to recover the amount to
which he may by reason thereof be entitled."
Section 52-1-11, u.c.A., 1953, states:
"Whenever, except in criminal prosecutions, any
special penalty, forfeiture or liability is imposed
upon any officer for nonperformance or malperfor-
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mance of his official duties, the liability
therefor attaches to the official bond of such
officer."
The legal test for the application of the foregoing
provisions is stated in Bowman v. Hayward, 1 U.2d 131, 262
P2d 957 (1953):
"The test should be: would he (the public officer)
have acted in the particular instance if he were
not clothed with his official character, or would
he have so acted if he were not an officer? If he
assumed to act as an off icer--whether under valid
or void process, or under no process whatever--the
bondsman should be held, as he is held, for they
are the sponsors of his integrity as an officer
while acting as such."
Most obvious in the case at bar is the fact that
the collection and disbursement of tax money is an official
act of an officer-the Treasurer.
As the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated in
applying the rule to the Sheriff in Sheriff of Salt Lake
County v. Board of Commissioners, Supra:
"Certain it is that the board of commissioners is
not nor are any of its members in any sense civilly
or otherwise liable for the official acts of a
deputy sheriff but the sheriff is so civilly
liable."
The public policy underlying the aforesaid Statutes
and Court ruling is to protect the public entity and its
taxpayers from any liability that might result from the
deliction of a public officer.

The County and the public
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are not insurers of the officer's conduct--that is the legal
role of his sureties on his bond.

POINT VII
GRANITE IS BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES
BY REASON THAT THEY ARE SPECULATIVE OR
CONSEQUENTIAL.
Granite's recovery is barred by sovereign immunity,
whether common law or Statutory, because actions for damages
are not permitted with respect to governmental functions
unless there is an express Statutory waiver, and no waiver
exists as to speculative or consequential damages.

Holt v.

Utah State Road Commission, 30 U.2d 4, 511 P2d 1286 (1973):
State v. Tanner, 30 U.2d 19, 512 P2d 1022 (1973).
Granite's contentions that damages should be
measured by what Respondents could have made or should have
made, or what Granite could have made or should, are at best
consequential and most probably speculative.

Therefore,

recovery is barred as a matter of law.
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POINT VIII
GRANITE IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
AS TO A PORTION OF THE RECOVERY IT SEEKS
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ITS REMEDY LIES IN
DAMAGES OR EQUITY.
GRANITE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WAS NOT
DAMAGED AS IT ALLEGES.
Assuming for argument that Granite was not barred
from recovery on any one or all of the grounds heretofore
asserted by Respondents, and assuming Granite could have
proved the amount of interest earned on its funds, if any,
by

County, Granite, nevertheless, is not the real party in

interest as to most of the funds involved in this suit.
The percentages next set forth represent those percentages of Granite's total real property tax receipts that
are directly tied to the State's Uniform School Fund.
1973-1974

(53%; 1974-1975 (61%); 1975-1976 (62%). (T-279)

The percentages represent that proportion

of

Granite's total real property tax receipts on which the
State of Utah, by law, pays a fixed sum of money.

That is,

regardless of the amount Granite receives on that proportion of tax monies, the State guarantees and pays to the
school district a fixed sum of money.

Furthermore, on most

of those funds, any tax raised in excess of the State's
guarantee must be paid by teh County Treasurer into the
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State Uniform School Fund.

Consequently, as to the above-

referenced percentages of total receipts, Granite can have
no damage--it received all of the money the law allows.
The relevant provisions of the Tax Code on the
minimum school program are set forth below.

Section 59-9-2,

u.c.A., 1953, states:
"During the first week in August the state tax
commission shall ascertain from the state board of
education the number of distribution units in each
school district in the state of Utah for the
current school year, estimated according to the
Minimum School Finance Act, and the moneys
necessary for the cost of the operation and maintenance of the minimum school program of the state
of Utah for the school fiscal year beginning July
1st preceding.
0
(1) The state tax commission shall then determine for each school district the amount that should
be raised by the minimum basic tax levy that it is
required to impose in conformity with the requirements of the Minimum School Finance Act as its
contribution toward the cost of the basic statesupported program.
0

(2) Each county auditor shall be notified by
the state tax commission of the fact that said
minimum basic tax levy must be imposed by the
school district and of the amount of such levy, to
which shall be added such additional amount, if
any, due to local undervaluation as hereinafter
provided. The auditor shall inform the board of
county commissioners as to the amount of such levy.
The board of county commissioners shall at the time
and in teh manner provided by law make such levy
upon the taxable property in the school district
together with such further levies for school purposes as may be required by each school district to
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pay the costs of programs in excess of the basic
state-supported school program.
"(3) In the event that the levy applied
according to the above schedule will raise an
amount in excess of the total basic state-supported
school program for any one school district, such
excess amount shall be remitted by the county,
within which such district is located, to the state
treasurer to be credited by him to the uniform
school fund to be used for allocation to school
districts as are other moneys therein to support
the basic state-supported school program. The
availability of said money shall be considered by
the tax commission in fixing the state property tax
levy as provided in the Minimum School Finance
Act." (emphasis added)
Section 59-9-2.l reads:
"In providing for remittance to the state
treasurer of any excess collections from the tax
levy applied for the basic state-supported program
as specified in paragraph (2) [(3)] of section
59-9-2, Utah Code Annoted 1953, as amended by
Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 1953, First Special
Session said excessamount shall be remitted in the
following manner:
"(a) Monthly, as said levies are collected,
ninety percent of the amount by which the money
then collected, pursuant to said levy, exceeds the
estimated total basic state-supported school
program of the district upon the basic (basis) of
which the levy was computed, shall be transferred.
"(b) As soon after the end of the school year
as the school district can determine the actual
cost of its basic state-supported school program
and inform the county auditor thereof, the county
shall determine the actual! amount of said excess
and remit the same to the state treasurer."
A reciprocal provision in the Education Code,

-41-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Section 53-7-18, U.C.A., 1953, provides:
"The state shall contribute to each district
toward the cost of the basic state-supported school
program in such district that portion which exceeds
the proceeds of a minimum basic tax levy of 28
mills imposed by the district.
"In order to qualify for receipt of the state
contribution toward the basic program and as its
contribution twoard its costs of said basic
program, each school district shall impose a minimum basic tax levy of 28 mills.
"In the school districts where the proceeds of
the minimum basic tax levy equal or exceed the cost
of the basic state-supported school program, there
shall be no contribution by the state toward the
basic program. The proceeds of any said minimum
basic tax levy of a school district which exceed
the cost of the basic program shall be paid into
the uniform school fund as provided by law."
The required minimum basic tax of 28 mills may be
adjusted by the State Tax Commission to obtain parity statewide on property tax assessment levels.

Illustratively,

Granite was only required to levy 27.23 mills in 1974.
However, regardless of the amount of money raised by this
mill levy, Granite, by law was entitled to receive no more
or no less than $508.00 per weighted pupil unit in 1973-74,
and $560.00 for 1974-75, 75-76. (T-282)
Thus, having received all the law permits, Granite
has no damage.
Likewise, in equity, if interest follows principal,
interest that might be due is due the State, not Granite.
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As the consequence of the state-supported programs
above-referenced, Granite received all the money the law
allows on those percentages of its total tax income alluded
to earlier.

Thus, Granite had no damages.

Likewise, if it

be asserted that interest income follows principal, said
interest would be owing to the State and not to Granite.
POINT IX
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WOULD BE TOTALLY
INAPPROPRIATE AND UNENFORCEABLE.
A review of the allegations of Granite's Alias
Second Amended Complaint will quickly demonstrate that
Granite did not plead a case for injunctive relief.

Nor did

the evidence at trial present a basis for injunctive relief.
The Legislature has recognized that in the area of taxation,
the remedy of injunction should be limited.

Section

59-11-14, u.c.A., 1953, as amended, specifically prohibits
the remedy of injunction except where the Court determines
the alternative remedy to be inadequate.

As was stated by

Justice Wolfe:
"Taxation proceedings are on a time table. When
an agency charged with a series of duties in relation to a taxation plan or program is stopped at
the beginning or before the final step in the process of the execution with which it is charged,
much public harm may result."
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"What would happen to the whole of our taxing
machinery if at any stage of the functioning a taxpayer could by injunction or Writ of Prohibition,
hold up all succeeding steps • • • "
Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 139 P2d 663
(1942).
While the above language referred to the Statute
relating to payment under protest, the reasoning is equally
applicable to the instant action.

The Courts should be very

careful when dealing with the function of a governmental
body such as is involved in this case.

Such bodies must be

given reasonable latitude of discretion to carry out their
responsibilites in an efficient and appropriate manner.

See

Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners, 499 P2d 270 (1972).

Not only is injunctive

relief inappropriate in tax cases, it is also disruptive.
If the Court were to undertake to fashion some type of
injunctive relief against the Treasurer, it would involve
itself into the entire tax structure, because the
Treasurer's ability to perform his functions is dependent
upon the Auditor.

The Auditor depends upon the County

Commission, which in turn depends upon the Assessor.

The

Assessor depends upon the Recorder.
The jobs performed by each of the County officials
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with regard to taxes in turn are influenced by the Tax
commission.

Each time the Treasurer was delayed by the

actions of some other body of officer, he would have to
involve the Court to avoid being in contempt of the Court's
order.

THe imposition of an injunction against the

Treasurer would embroil the Court into an insurmountable
task.

It is a maxim of equity that the Court will not adju-

dicate an issue where the problems of fashioning a remedy
are so difficult as to be insurmountable.

Dixon v. Attorney

General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 313 Fed. Supp.
653 (1970).

Similarly, equity will do nothing in vain.

Godbolt v. Clinton Sheet Greater Bethlehem Temple, 167
N.W.2d 97.

See also Libberman v. Libberman, 130 N.Y.2d 163;

Sane v. Montana Power, 20 Fed. Supp. 843.

A Court of equity

will never assume jurisdiction to prepare a decree dependent
for its efficacy on the approval or rejection of some other
coordinator or inferior board or tribunal, but only when it
can enforce its decree.
The Court would have to depend upon the efficacy of
any injunctive relief in this case upon the inferior tribunal of the State Tax Commission, the County Board of
Equalization, the Auditor, Assessor, and Recorder.

For

these reasons, Granite's request should be denied.
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POINT X
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING COUNTIES
EQUITABLE COUNTERCLAIM WHEN THE FACTS
RELATING TO THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF
GRANITE WERE UNCONTROVERTED.
The Trial Court specifically found that Granite was
not unjustly enriched at the expense of Salt Lake County,
even though the cost of collecting, apportioning, and
distributing tax monies for Granite exceeded the amount paid
for such services (T-427).
During the years 1973 thorugh 1977, Salt Lake
County expended $1,133,415.00 more to collect Granite's
share of taxes than it received from Granite.

This evidence

was not disputed by Granite.
Granite's Alias Second Amended Complaint and
County's Counterclaim are both based upon the equitable
theory of unjust enrichment.

The County proved that Granite

has been unjustly enriched at its expense.

Granite failed

to prove unjust enrichment of the County at Granite's
expense.

Since Granite sought equity, it likewise should be

compelled to do equity.

See Carbon Canal Company v. Sanpete

Water User's Assocation, 425 P2d 405 (1967).

For the Trial

Court to deny Salt Lake County's Counterclaim when the evidence was uncontroverted " • • • would do violence to the
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well-known maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity."
Glenn v. Player, 326 P2d 717 (1958).
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
Trial Court's judgment denying Salt Lake County equitable
relief on its counterclaim should be reversed and judgment
should be entered in favor of County on its Counterclaim and
against Granite.
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CONCLUSION
County respectfully submits that the decision of
the Trial Court was correct insofar as it concluded that
Salt Lake County had not been unjustly enriched at the
expense of Granite School District and should therefore be
affirmed.

However, the evidence was uncontroverted that

Granite School District has been unjustly enriched by more
than $1,000,000.00 at the expense of all Salt Lake County
taxpayers.

This inequity should be remedied.

Judgment

should be awarded in favor of County on its Counterclaim
against Granite for the reasons set forth in County's Brief,
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 1981.

By·./;t.~~~~'lJL_~~~~~~

il
ho as Peters
Special Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants,
Respondents, Cross-Appellants
400 Chancellor Building
220 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 531-7575
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Plaintiff/Appellant, 800 Continental Bank Building, Salt
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March, 1981.
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